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Chapter I

Psychology recognizes that d1.f'ferences in behavior are in part,
a f'unction of the differences in the wq an :lnd1v1dual organizes and
perce1ves his world.

It is also assumed that an individual acts

d:U'ferently under stress.

However. the respect in which dif'fer.i.ng

perceptiona and d1£fering degrees of anxiety a.f'fect the wq a person
tends to meet various life situations has not been ful.ly investigated.

In everydq life situations, decisive choices :must be made) such

choices mq involve risk t.aJd.rsg.

In risk tald.ng, an "1nd1v1dual per-

oeives an e.nv:tronmentaJ. situation that requires a certain behavior to

avoid failure.

It is a condition of uncertainty about the probability

of f'a:nure lt (Roclcwell. 1962).

Researchers have long asked whether

there is a motivational prec:1iBpositlon toward risk or conservatism in
the perstmality.

Is it more characteristic of certain kinds of people

than of others? Can it be observed? (KOgan and Wallach, 1964).
Hesults in r1sk-taldng experiments ha.ve been as varied as the

studies but one consistent finding has been that the willingness to
take risks is probably no general trait, but rather varies f'ram situation to situation w.1.thin the same individual (lC.ogan &: Wallach,

1964J

Slov1c, 1962). It becomes necessary then, to define the ld.nd of r1sk-

1

2
taldng behavior that is being examined at an:! particular time.

For

this stuc:W "amount of risk" is defined as the amount of chance a subject is ldJling to take in a series of hypothetical llie situations,
e.g., what probability of success does a person require when risks
involv:i.ng income, defeat, marriage, etc., are faced?

which the fear of fa:Uure deters

a person and/or

~e

extent to

the hope ot success

spurs him on w.l.ll great,q determine his chances of taking a risk.
Atkinson (1957) has proposed that high anxious subjects are
pr1mar:Uy motivated by a "fear of fa:Uure" rather than a ·striving

for success. It
it.1es.

Ms leads them to prefer risks of extreme probabil-

It 'WOUld seem especially true of the persons high in Iftype..Olf

anxiety as differentiated

Schedule (PHS).

OIl

the Nicola.v-Walker Perscmal Reaction

"Type-O" anx1eV is "characterized by ooncern that

exterDal deands aDd perceived expectancies
QD.e

ma;r suffer harm" (Walker

&. H:lcola;y,

~

be overwhelming aDd

1963).

In an attempt to control or reduoe anxie1r-the degree of subjective probab1ll.ty of faUure-tbe individual restricts his psycho-

logical field to the point where he can master and control it.

IJhrough

this repreSSion or closing the mind to threatening ideas and activities
the individual loses some of his intellectual l"lexlbillty and freedcm

(Eriksen &. Eisenstein, 1953). According to Rokeach (1960) this
defense against anxiety makes an individual more
measured by Rokeachts Dogmatism. Scale.

do~t1c

as is

He refers to dogmatism as

being "the closed cognitive organizatiOll of beliefs and disbelief's

3
about reali tytt (Rokeach, McGovne,y & llenr\Y, 1955). In this context
a closed minded person could not so readily "receive, evaluate and
act em relevant information viewed .t"roIIl the outside on its own
intrinsio ne r:l.ts" (Rokeach, 1960).
It would appear then, that anxiev together with closed mindedness

(dogmati311l) would prevent an ind:l.v1dual .t"rcm evaluating and acting to
the best of his interests.

111., according to AUdnson's theor,y,

this should mean that he w:Ul take risks which tend to be inq:Julsive

aDd. axlir'eme rather than ones with modera.te probali l1t1es.

1b1s stu.dy' is a repJ.1caUOI1 and an extension of part of Rokeach' s
work a

1) to :mea.sure the relationship between dogmatism and the various
kinds of anxiev as determined by the d1tterential anxietu scale (PRS) ,

particul.ar1ly fttqpe-O."
2) to determine the relatiODBhip tha.t mq exist betI4'een anxiety
and risk tak1ng in both high dogma.tic and low dogmatic individuals.

Chapter

n

Rev:lew o£ Related Literature
Risk taking has long been studied

treD. a broad range ot approaches.

Gamblers, economists I psycholoe1sts, as well as the average man, have

been searching tor answers 1'rom which risk-tald..ng behavior can be
predicted.

']hus tar, researchers have not been too successfuJ. in

finding a 'Wtl;r

to measure and predict this variable. Slavic (1962)

came to the conclusion, after assessing the current research, that
there is a lack o£ convergent valid1ty among risk-tald.ng

me~""Ures.

He fUrther stated that possibly risk t,aking was no general trait at
all, but ra.ther one which varies .from situation to situat10n within

the same individual.
sional in nature.

Risk-taking behavior appears to be mult1dimen-

It seems to include a substantial subjective

component and a variety o£ motivational and other 1nt1uencese

Very

likely, this largely accounts tor the contradictory results tound in
the research (Slovic, 1964).

It therefore, becomes vast:J.:y necessary

in future research, to adequately define the area o£ concentration.

Formerly, models ot decision-making ignored personality variables,
but this was found inadequate tor predicting behavior.
& Manas (19$9) show the necessity

into formal. modes.

SCodel, Ratoosh,

ot incorporating such variables

1hey experimenta.lly showed that 1) the expected

4
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dollar value has negligible importance in determining betting preferences, 2) intelligence was not significantly related to degree of
risk taking and 3) low P83" ott subjects displ~ greater tear of

tailure than high ptq o£t subjects.
Rockwell (1962) sqs that risk exists where the condition of
uncertainty exists.

It implies makibg a subjective judgment when the

individual does not know, with a high degree of certainty that an

action taken by him will have a tavorable outcome.

ftisk is conoeptual

tor it is a .function of the person' s perception both of h::ts own
capabilities and the requirements ot the tasks.

Ziller (1957) speaks

of a ltutil::tty tor risk" in decision mald.ng and Brim (1957) calls it

udesire for oertainty. n SUch "dUbjective probabilities ll acoord::1ng

to

SUppes and Y4a1ch (1959) govern the estimation

ot a. person's chances

and his relative preferenoes which in blm determine the amount ot

risk he is ldlling to take.
In the study ot vocational ohoioes, Ziller (1957) tound that

deoisions made about lite choices are based on a model of risk.

Mahone

( 1960) concluded. .from his study, that persons fea.r£ul of failure
tended to be unrealistic in their vocational choice with respect to
both ability and interest.

1his was due to a relative lack ot relevant

information about the kinds of interest satisfaction tound in the various
occupational areas.
Risk taking also varies with sex. When doing an i tam analyses
of the chances taken in hypothetical situations, men and women varied

6
as to the s1 tuat10n and the degree of certainty required be.fore ma1d.ng
a risky decision (Wallach & Kogan, 1959, 1961} Slov1e, 1964). Women

were highly certain less .frequently than men, but men the;sr were very
certain they were more willing to take large risks.

It was also tound

that older persons of both sexes require higher probability
before consenting to a risky act.

o:r

success

It becomes evident, therefore, that

r1sk-tald.ng behaVior is extremely specific as to ldnd, situ.-1.tion, age,
and sex.

In this study :risk-tak1ng behavior will be examined as it is

mani.tested by decis1ve choices in eve¢v life situations.

1his 1s

a tandJiar area. ot experience, but an uncommon area to measure.

Torrance and Ziller (1951) seem to be among the first to construct
an inventory to assess risk-taking propensities from a knowledge of
lite experiences.

FollO'..r.lng th1s ,Wallach and Kogan (1959, 1961)

developed a questionnaire to obtain probabU1ty preferences in everyday lite 81tuations.

111is was called the "Dilemmas ot Choice Quea-

tiondaire lf in one study and the "DisutU1ty ot Fallure Index u in
another.

1bis questionna.ire 1s f'urther described elsmmere in this

paper.
In discussing the "disutillty of ta1lure tt Wallach and Kogan (1959)

assume that the extent t.o 'WtIich the fear ot tallure deters us and the
hope

ot success spurs us on

taking risks.

ldll greatly determine our chances of

Eanotional arousal-tear or hope--seema to be a prereq-

uisite tor excitation

ot risk-taking propensities. Feathers (1959)

7
used a model in 'Whicb be assumed independence betlvcen utility and
subjective probability ot success or failure.

But in

s~

risk

taking more extensively (Wallach & Kogan, 1961) it was .found that

"disutility (deterrence) of failure is positively related to subjective
probability of failure.

'lhis concept implies that risk taking is

dependent on motivation.
Atkinson, in his studies with achievement and anxiety has c3St up
a theoretical model whereby we can hypothesize about the various

motivational factors affecting risk taking (Atkinson, 19$7; Atkinson
& Litwin, 1960; Atkinson, Bastian, Earl & Litw.1n, 1960).

He distin-

guishes the "hope of success" persm .from the "tear of failure" perRon
and f':1.nds tha.t the rela.tive strength of the motive inf1uencing the

subjective probability of the consequences in consistent with tha.t

motive.

According to his theory, when an individual's motive to

achieve success 1s stronger than his motive to avoid failure, it
results in approach motivation, no matter what the level of difficulty
of the task.

'lhis"hope of success" person is most attracted to tasks

of intermediate dif'£1cul.ty where the subjective probability of success

is .$0.

em.

the other band it the motive to aV'oid tailure-which is

presumed to be a disposition to became anxious about tailure under
achievement stress-is strODger it results in avoidant motivation for

all levels ot difficulty.

ibis "tear of failure lt person finds all

aohievement tasks unattractiva, particuJ.arily ones
d::U'ficuJ.ty.

ot intermed:1ate

He prefers instead either very easy and safe underta.king

a
or extrauely ditficult and speculative undertaking, but he must select
a task even though all the alternatives are threaten1!lg to h:iJn..

type of

parSell

defensively

nds

sets his aspirati<m level either defensively high or

lOWe

Hancock and. Teevan (1964) used Atk:l.nson'tJ model and found it
predicts

verr well in

a r:Lsk situation with actual monetary' rewards.

But sl1gbtJ.y di.:t.ferent £raa A:t1d.nson's findings, their "fear of" fai.lure"

subjects att.enq>ted to avoid failure by invariabq choosing the dif'ficult
odds.

1bis choice would not be cause for selt-blame or em'barrasmnent

since fo.:Uure can be viewed as a function of the d.i.£tieuJ:t odds rather
than personal. failure.

Likewise "fear of failure It subjects made more

irrational d.ec1siGn.s.

B.rocV' (1963) also attempted to validate AUdnsonis theoretical
model wich related ind1v1dual dif'terences in mot!vation to r:Lsk-tald.ng

bebav1or. His findings were 1D. agrefII8Dt with Atk1naon and Litwin (1960)
that high

ft

risks, but

Achievement, low anxious subjects tend to choose intermed1ate

on:q zen

these r1sks were measured in terms ot the medie.n

and. not by subjective conf'idence statements.
Atkinson end Litwin (1960) oonf'irmed their hypothesis that what
has been called "teat anxiety-It is a disposition to avoid fa1lurefollow1ng the werle:

or Kandler

and Sarason (1952, 1959).

In risk taking

(Rockwell, 1962), an individual perceives an 8I'lT.f..ronmental situation
which he appraises, then makes a judgPlent relevant to his s1d.1.l
capabil1ties. Havil'lg done this, the person acts in order to avoid

.failure.
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It would seem that the quality of the risk-taking behavior is in

part a .tunction of the degree of the disposition to avoid failure-anxiety.

In the literature there is mu.ch inconsistent and even contradictory
find'ngs regarding the effect of anxiety on behavior.

1b.ere is reason

to believe that the various measures of anxiety in current use are not
all measuring the same thing and turthermore, there pl'Obably is no
simple or general. relationship.

However, there mq be various kinds

of anxiety and a di.ff'erential anxiety test is needed to measure it as

Wal.ker and Nicolq (1963) propose to do with the PrlS.

1'a.Ylor and

Spence (19$2) found high anxious indiv1du.als to have a performance

decrement but that the disruptive effects of various responses to
anxiety vary with the nature of the task.

Mandler and Sarason (1952)

saw the relationship as a little more complex-that high anxious
persans have built up a d1tferent hab1t of responding to anxiety than

low anxious persons.

the high anxious respond to anx1ety with various

responses, intemal and externaJ., which are incompatible with the
efficient pursuit of a complex task.

'!he low anxious evidently lack

tb1s strong habit of respond:Sng to anxiety with task-irrelevant

responses.
Another characteristic of the high anxious person t s responses
1s that they are more ego-involved, more selt-oriented and are more
interfering when threat is perceived in the environment (Sarason, 1960).
1bere 1s, however, negative correlation of test anxiety with most

10
measures of intellectual nbUi ty (&.rason, 1959).

~is kind o£

anxiety seems to correspond to that which Walker alld. Nicolay (1963)
CCl.ll "type-Otf.

~is

subtype of anxiety is character:l.zed by concern

"that 8X:ternal demands and perceived expectancies may be over-melming
and

one may suffer harm. ft
Researchers have approached. the problem of anxiety.from the

standpoint of the defense mechanisms likely to be evoked.

'lhis is

another, or possibly a better Wa'¥ of explaining indiv1d.ual differences
due

to anxiety. sarason and. Mandler (1952) supposed that high anxious

subjects react differently because of the differences in the learned
defense mechanisms that beccmae manifest.

~e

low anxious are not as

likely to be in need of these defenses.

'When the high anxious individual attempts to control and reduce

his anxiety, he becomes rigid through repressing the threatening ideas.
In this wa:;r his alternatives tor acting are reduced and he loses mu.ch

of his freedom. and flexibility.

It is as though he is unable to face

ambiguities in this world and so he becomes :more r1gid-clinging to

,!Xternal st1mull-in order not to become completely overwhelmed. All
ego-def'ense mechanisms produce some degree of unadapt1ve rigidi 'GY in
the personality (FrendeJ.-Brunswik, 1949. Eriksen &: Elsenstein, 1953.
Cattell, 1952J Fervin, 1960J Kogan & \iallach, 1964).
Eventhough we are not concemed in this paper with rigidi 'GY per
but w1th a related phencm.om.en, dogmatism, there 1s relevance.

~

Dogmatism

is a higher order and more complexly organized form of inf'lexibility.

11

It is more concemed with ability to integrate "new sets" into a
current belief system whereas rigidity deals with breaking down old
patterns of behavior and sets (Rokeaeh, 19$$). llokeach, in his extensive
work on the open and closed mind (Rokeach, 1960) de£ined dogmatism as

a "closed cognitive organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about
reality." He supposes that a person's beliet system is open or closed,
as indexed by the score on the Dogmatism Scale, and this is dependent

upon the extent to which that individual "can receive, evaluate and
act on relevnnt information viewed !'rom the outside on its
sic

mente."

mJ1l

intrin-

He then proposes that perha.ps "to the extent that a belief-

disbelief system. is closed it represents a cognitive netirork of defenses
against anxiety. It
.Although dogmatism has been chietly observed in the political
and religious spheres , it is

not iIrlpossible to find it in other realms

of intellectual and cul.tural activity.

An individual can be dogmatic

in his own idiosyncra.tic way, evolv:lJ1g a unique integration of ideas
and beliets and reality (Rokea.ch, 1954).

Cbjective reality is repre-

sented to him by certain beliefs or expectations that he accepts as
true or talse.

Bokeach concludes that the more dogmatic a person's

belief system is, the more subjected he is to continual stresses and

strains .from objective and social reality} the more isolation there
is among the various parts of his baliet system. the more will incoming
information be seen as irrelevantJ the more threatening \d.1l contradictory events be) the less readily will he be able to face the present
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objective reality and evaluate it in order to be able to make a
realistic judgment concerning it (Rokeaoh. 1954).
It can be surmised that it is not so much the anxiety itsel.t
that is responsible for the performance decrement as the result of the
defense employed against the anxiety.

'lhis was also noted by Sarason

and Mrmdler (1952) and by stone (1964).

\fuen testin[; 6th grade boys

Ruebush (1960) concluded sim:Uarily that the ef'f'act of anxiety on
perfol'llWlCa, whether facilitating or interfering, is m.ediatad primarily
by defensive reactions to the anxiety.
Some have wondered mether amount of risk could be a f'unotion of

capacity factors.

'lbe general conclusion found was that risk does not

correlate with intelligence or scholastic achievement to 8lI1' significant

degree (Stone, 1964; Ziller, 1957).

It would sas more likely then,

that risk-taking behavior depends on personality correlates.
Beier (1951) fouad the indiv1<ht.al who is faced with threat and
is in the state of pnx1ety shows a loss of "abstract" abilities or,

more specifically, he experiences a loss in naxibility of intellectual
i'unction.

'lbis means that the person perceives and interprets each

new set of st:Lmull. in

~

different wqs according to his needs. His

ability to judge, to see essential relationships, to sh1tt adequately
has decreased.

'VJhen asked to act he proj ects his own need-eontusion

onto the stimuli seeing it in terms of such connicting needs that he
cannot respond adequately.

Rls perceptual field is nal"'l"'OVred.

Most

stimuli appear threatening because the individual cannot cope ldth

13
them, hence he is likely to l1ndt his awareness of such experiences.
His behavior ldll be characterized by rigidity and constriction.
Very differing results have been obtained in 'tmich no relation-

Ship was found to exist between anxiety and performance on either a

rigidity or a perceptual task (Cowen, Hei11zer, Axelrod & Alexander,

1957). 1h1s author wonders whether different results v;ould have been
obtained had a ditferential anxiety test been used.
Kogan and toJallach (1964) had expected anxiety and rigidity to be
i.nVersely related to risk taking, whereas impulsiveness would be
positively associated with risk taking.
tionship oE anxiety with risk taking.

1hey found no direct rela-

However, persons high in

anxiety and also high in defensiveness tended to be more irrational
in risk-taking decisions.

RiSk-taking behavior seems to be more a

tunction of the self-image held by a defensive person.

1hese effects

are quite dissj,m:iJar across sex which led them to conclude that the
implications of personality for risk.tllldng behavior are strongly
sex-linked.
1:1.llenbaum and Jackman (1961) did a study which !nYolved a replicntion and an extension of part of Bokeach's ",ork on the relation
of dogma.tism n.nd anxiety to performance in a problem solving task.

'-he,y found 1} tha.t in a problem solving task subjects lOt., on dogmatism
performed more efficiently than those high on dognlatism. 2) there is
no relationship between generalized anxiety and. a problem solving task
and 3) that there is a de£inite relation between dogmatism and anxiety

14
scores (r .49).

'lb.e 1st and 2nd conclusions coincide vdth P..okea.ch's

(1960) findings stating that. to the degree that a. person is open or
closed depends on how that person views and

CM

act upon relevant

information viet.red. from the outside on it.9 Olm intrinsic meriw.

1here

is no reason then, to think a person acts :in such a lro:y soleIy because
o£ his position on a generalized onxiety d:imension.
1116 present study is also a. replication and exten:.>ion of' Rokeach' s

work, but .lith a few very specif'ic d.if'f'erenees.

A d1.t"ferentiated

anxiety scale (PUS) was used in an effort to clarify same o£ the con.tu.s1ng reS'lll ts found wen a generalized anxiety SCfu.e was used.

Another difference, 'Which is also a variation from. F.Ulenbaum and

Jackman's study, is the use of a situational-risk index rather than the
problem solving task.
behavior patterns.

»tis index appears to be a tnler indicator of

Chapter

In

Procedure

A.

&Ubjects:
A total of 92 male undergraduates from the treshman class :in

psychology class, 101, at Loyola University were tested.

illese sub-

jects were given three tests (PRS, Dogmatism Scale, Choice D1lemma)
each on di.f.f"erent day's during their reeular psychology class period.
Elttreme high and low groups were selected by using the upper
and the lower

25%

of each set of scores.

25%

Each extreme group consisted

ot approx:t.mately 23 subjects.
B.

'!'eats usedl
1.

To procure a ~'U.re

ot anxiety, a dilierential anxiety scale,

the Nico18\Y-Wa.lker Personal Reaction Schedule (PHS) was used.

2his

relatively nevT measure at anxiety is similar to the older 14AS (1-1an1.f'est
An.1d..ety Scale) :in that it is a True/False queatiormaire on which the
subject atte..,ts to his subjective feelings of anxiety.

It has however,

important dll'.l.'erences represent.iJ::Ig some unique innovations.
Ule P.RS contains three subscales which corresponds to the three

isolated factors representing three relatively "pure" types of' anxiety.
ille three sub-scales are operationa.lly defined as a

15
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Anxiety Type M (Motor Tension)
~ M anxiety is charactorized by concern ldth
external achievements coupled with physical. tenBion
-which acts aD a defense agairwt feelings of inadequacy.
vihen frustration occurs, energy is channeled somaticaJ..4r
instead of psychically. ~ M amdety recul ts in
l'O'Per-activity. physical and mental restJ.essness, or
jumpiness •
.An:ld.ety ~ 0 (Obj cct)
1YPe 0 anxiety is characterized by concem that
eA."temal dElWlds and perceived expectancies ma.y be
Overwiieiirrl.ng and one mq suffer harm. It represents

a projection or rationalization of one.s possible
personal inadequacy. It results in a magn1t:ication of
personal probleas out of proportion to obj sctive reality.
~e emphasis here is on the EDCtemal as a source of
uncertainty or unrest.

"7Pe P (Personal Inadequacy)
Type P anxiety is characterized by concern that

Anxiety

one may not be capable or meeting the di££iculties of
life. ~e person himBe1£ feels inadequate and the
inadequacy lies wi thin himsel£. 1he.re is a certain
helplessness and sel.t-evaluation which mrq give rise
to guilt feelings. DIe focus of' the uncertainty is on
one's own inadequacy.
Total anxiety score is the

SWIl

of ntype-H, If "typewO," "type-P."

111e total PBS consists of 87 anxiety i tams mixed with 30 K-scale

items from. the MKPI.
2.

To obta:1n a measure of closed mindedness (dogmatism),

11Qkeach t s Dogmatism Seale

\-laB

used.

111e 40 items o.t Bokeach I s last

revision of the scale (Form E) plus the instructions ware taken from

1!!!. ~!S!! Closed

~ by MUton Rokeach (1960).

Th.e 1temG were

mixed up 'Tell and padded ldth 22 statements from the Goug'h-San£ord

Rigidity Scale.

111is latter scale is now included in the Calif'om.ia

Psychological Inventory where it is labeled FX (Flexibility).
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SUbjects were asked to mark each statement according to their
degree of agreement or disagreement,

plus 1 I agree a little
plus 2 I agree on the whole
plus 3 I agree very much

-1 I disaeree a little
-2 I disagree on the whole
-3 I disagree very much

3. 'lhe amount of risk was determiDed by the amount of chance
a subject was wUliDg to take :in a series of hypothetical lite
situations on the Choice Dilemma Procedure.

1his questionnaire was

developed by Wallach and ~ogan (1959, 1961) to obtain probab:U1ty
preferences in eve::yday' situations.

<a this test

each subject is

presented with 12 hypothetical situations, each requiring a choice
between a sa:te alternative and a more attractive but risky one.

H1s

task is to illdicate the proba.bllity of success 'VJh1ch wouJ.d be
sufficient for him to select the risky alternative.
Afs

an example

or

the ai tuations presented, the first i tam

.follows in its entirety:
Mt-. A, an electrical engineer, Yho is married and
has one child, has been working for a large electronics
corporation since graduating !rom college five years ago.
He is assured of a lite-time job 1dth a modest" though
adequate, salary, and liberal pension benefits upon
retirement,. en the other hand, it is very unlikely
that his salary will increase mu.oh before he retires.
"Jhile attending a convention, Mr. A is of.fered a job
with a small, newly founded compan;y wtdch has a ldghly
uncertain future. ~e new job would pay more to start
and vrould o.t.fer the possibility o.t a share in the
ownership :i£ the company SlU"V'1ved the competition o.t the
larger firms.

Iaagine that you are advising Mr. A. Listed below
are several probabilities or odds of the new company's
proving .financially sound.

Plea.se mark in the appropriate space on the answer
sheet the 100.Jest probability tJlat you \·;ould consider
acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr. A to take the
net;,r job.
<1.

b.

c.
d.
e.
-

'lhe chances 3.re 1 in
financially sound.
~e chances are 3 in
financially sound.
'lbe chances are 5 in
financially sound.
'lbe chances ~ 7 in
financially sound.
1h.e chances are 9 in
i":I.nancially sound.
Leave i l l the spaces
~ take the new job

10 ·Un>.t the

COlUp&.r.\)·

'!<rill )r'ove

10 ii.a.t. the

COlllPnll~y

vJill prove

10 that the COlll:P~ ".ti.l1 prove
10 that the company ""ill prove
10 t.ba.t the

CO!llpaIlY

"'rill prove

blank 1£ you think Mr. A should
no matter what the probabilities.

1be response categories were arranged from chances of one in

ten upward for the odd items and .f'rc:n high probabilities down to
chances of one in ten for the even items, thus counterbalnncing
for an;y order preferences in cboiee of proba.bility levels.

Refusal

to recommend the risky alternative no matter ",mat its probability
of success was scored as

ten.

nte larger the probability level

selected, the greater the amount ot conservatism.

c.

statistics Used:
1) Pearson Product Moment Correlations betwoen dogmatism scores

and each

ot tlle anxiety scales taken separDtely

and

togeth~;

correla-

tiona of risk tcld..ng with all the scDles of ar.tXiety and doe;m.at1sm.

2) t test

£'01'

fi.nding signif.'iccnce of difi'er(>,nce batt·roen tiro r f s

not, independently distributed but correlated.

3)

~

group approach I

correlations between the various scales
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of anxiety, dogmatism and risk taking with the upper

25% and the

lower 25% of scores. Significant difference between the extreme
group correlations-tested by • test.
D.

Specific hypothesis testedl

1) 7bere is a Significant positive relationship bett-reen scores
on the dogmatism and anxiety scales (subtypes and total) ba.sed on

total group of 92 SSe
2) Anxiety of the f'type-O" sort will be significantJ..y more
positively correlated to dogmatism. than "t\vpe-P or type-M anxiety
in total group of Ss.
3) 7bere tdll be a signi:ficant d.:1.£terence in the relationship between anxiety and risk taking for high dogmatic individuals as opposed

to low dogmatic individuals in the extreme groups of 23 Sa each.

Chapter IV
Results
lhe resuJ.ts, in general .. indicated that there was a significant

positive relatiODBhip between closed mindedness and anxiety.

lhere

was also a s1gn1f'icant relationship between anxiety and risk taking in
the high dogmatic individuals but not in the lOtT dogmati,o b'Ubjeots as
these three variables were operationally defined and manipulated in
this study.
Table 1 presents the meana and standard deviations o£ the three
subtests and total anxiety, dogmatism and risk-taking soores.
Table 1

Anxiety, Dogmatism and R1sk-Taldng Soores

for the Total Group

(N • 92)
SCale

Hean

S.D•

•

9.22
8.82
8.68
26.72

~M

T.vPe-O
fype-P

Total M-O-P
Dogmatism

101.64

68.$2

Risk TaldDg
20

3.62
3.94
.3.74
9.3.3
22.17
14•.30
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Table 2 presents the correlations existing between dogmatism
and the various sub-scales n.nd. total anxiety scale

Walker Personal

l~action

sign1t1cantly.t'roll zero.

Schedule.

ot the N1col.a\r-

All ot the correlations differ

Correlation of "type-O" aDX1ety 1d.th

dogmat1sm., however, does not d1tter signit:Loantly f'rom Ittype-M&t or

Iftype-pn anxiety as was hypothesized.

1h1s latter was determined

by using the t test tor finding significance of ditference between

two rts which are not independently distributed, but oorrelated.
Table 2
Correlations between Dogmatism. and the
Various Anxiety Scales
(N • 92)

Scale

Correlation Ooet.t.
,

Signifioance

p

.0>

f.vpe-M

.26

sig. at

1'3Pe-O

.37

sig. at .01

1!fpe-P

.29

sig. at .01

Total M-o-p

.37

sig. at .01
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Table 3 presents the correlations between the measures of
anxiety with risk taldng as well as the correlation of dogmatism't.n.th
r1sk ta.ld.ng.

sero.

No one of the correlations differs significantly .from

It is clearly evident that neither anxiety alone or dogmatism

alone has arq signif'icant innuence on risk taking when computed
£'rom the total group.

Table 3
Correlations of Rt.sk Tald.ng with the Various
Measures of Anxiety and DogmatiSlil

(Ii .. 92)

Scale

Oo.rrelaticm Coetf.

Signit:Lcance

Type-M

-.06

n.s •

~

•os

n.s •

!ype-P

• 08

n.s •

Total M-o-p

•03

n.s •

Dogmatism

•04

n.s.
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Table 4 shows the means aDd sUlndard deviations for the extreme
groups in anxiety, dogmatiSlll, and. risk taldng.

In each set o£

measures the high and low group meano ere at least tlro standard
deviations in opposite directions fro1l1 the total mean (Table 1).
~is

amount would be S'Il.ffic1ent to make significantly d.1.fterent

groups.
Table

4

Erl.reme Group Scorea tor the Various Measures
of Anxiety, DogJilatism, and. Risk Taking

(N •

23)
High

SCale

Means

S.D.

Low
Heans
S.D.
•

Type-M

14.09

2.02

4.96

1.02

1'ype-O

14.09

2.70

4.35

1.26

~p

13.61

2.97

4.57

1.32

Total H-O-P

39.22

5.79

15.91

2.72

129.74

12.54

73.70

8.78

85.74

7.37

51.09

6.79

Dograati_

a:t.sk

Taldng

Table

5 presents

the means and standard deviations o:t the

risk tald.ng and various amdety scores in both the high and the
low dogmatic groups.

Table

5

Various .An2d.ety and R1.sk-Taldng Scores

in High and Low Dogmatic Groups
(N • 2,3)

5csle

H1gh Dog.

Low Dog.

Means

S.D.

~M

10.26

3.56

7.78

3.22

T3Pe-O

10.26

3.32

7.17

3.07

1YPe-P

9.78

3.77

7.26

3.35

Total M-o-p

30.30

8.62

22.22

6.76

Risk Taldng

69.91

15.14

65.87

11.73

~

S.D.
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Table 6 shows the relationship between risk taking and anxiety
in high dogmatio and low docmat1c individuals.

Sinoe high soores on

risk-taking scale indioates oonservatiSJJ1, it should be remembered that
a negative oorrelation indioates a relationship to various degrees
of "riskiness. II

~e

marked oorrelations differ signifioantly .from.

sero nt the .05 level of conf'idence.
Correla.tionB ot the high dogmatic groups dit£er trolll correlations
of the low dog:m.a.tic groups at the indicated levels o£ significance.

2hese dif'terences were tound by using FJ.sher I s statistical technique

tor .fin.ding ditterences between rls through t.ransformation to SIS
and computing the standard error

ot difference between

two SiS.

Table 6

Correlations between Anxiety and Risk Taking in
High and Low Dogmatic Individuals

(N ..

23)

H1gh Dog.

Low Dog.

•
D1f'f'erence
between r's

Type-M and Risk 'laid rag

-.42*

-.12

sig. at • .)4 level

~

and Risk Taking

-.44*

.18

sig. at .02 level

~p

and Risk Taking

-.22

.23

sig. at .07 level

-.44*

.14

sig. at .03 level

Total 11,..O-p and Risk Talc.

'* s1gnifioant at the

.OS

leVel of confidence
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Table 7 presents the correlations beween dogmatism and the

various measures ~ amd.ety in both high (conservative) aDd low

(risky) risk-1;aking individuals.

S1gn1t1cant coITelations are

indicated.

Table 7
Cox'relations between the Various .Anxiety Scales
and Dogmat:l..sa in BotJl High aDd Low

Risk-Taking Individuals

(N • 2,)

High R.T.

( Consel"V'dotiam)

Low R.T.
(Risky)

~

and Dogmatism

•.39

.14

~

and DogJaatism

.08

.S8H

fJrpe-P and Dogmatism

.OS

•.38

Total M-O-P and Dogmatism

.2h.

.4&1-

'* s!giilHoant attl'ie .cg level ot 'confidence··
** s1gnit1cant at the .01 leYel of confidence

Tabla 8 presents correlations between

dOg1llati.'3Il1

in various hi[;;h and low llleahureS of anxiety.

differs signi£:tcantJ.y £rom sero.

and risk taking

No one o:f the cor-relations

.All correlations however, follow

the expected direction.

Table 8
Correlations between Dogmatism and Risk Tak::i.ng in
High and Low Measures of Anxiety

(N • 23)

-.30

-.07
-.22

Chapt.er V
Discussion

'lhe most cler.rly defined reb"Ul ts at this stu.ctr are those
concerned v:ith h:n;otheses or:.e and two.

Hypothesis cme predicts

relationship betwE.en dogmatism and anxiety following Rokeach's

work. \Vhen testir..g groups in the lJnited States and mgland he
found dogmatism and anxiety to correlate from

1960).

.36

to

.64 (Rokeach.

AJ.though not as high (Table 2)" this present stu.d;y agrees

td.th the previous research of Rokeach thut anxiety is greater in
a relatively closed. system of belitrl:'.

1b sa:y that tldfi relatively

closed system serves as Ita tightly woven neVN'ork at cognitive
defenses aga.1nst anxiety" (Rokeaeh" 1960) ctlJUlOt be ~tated for

oertain, but it can be speculated that closed r.undedness could be
at least one means of' defense against anxiety.
~e

need to defend against threat, an individual's negree at

anxiety, seems to determine the extent to uhich a person is open or
closed to real!ty.

According

to Rokeach IS (1960) frBZD.e\'lOrk

1Ithin1d.ng

is not a private at.ta1r" and an open-minded person will more rea.dil.y
adjust to outside conditiona because anxiety has not closed him of'.t
:from the external stimuli that ma:y be a threat.

1\n open-minded"

non-threatened individual has the freedom to socially orientated.
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ltrcn the above and from Beier (1951) it

\vould seem that the

individual who uses closed mindedness to allq his an:xi.ety 'tv-auld be
the person' who

~rlences

external stimuli as threatening.

He feels

he cnnnot cope {ttth the threat and consequently is likely to limit his
awareness

or

such experiences, i.e. become closed minded.

Hypothesis

tvTO

was an extension of the relationship found

betvreen dogmatism and anxiety' with consideration givan to :tzP!s of
anxiety.

It was assumed by this author that anxiety steming £rom any

other source other than external demands would not so readUy correlate
with closed m::I.ndedness.
Table 2 af'i'1rms that ntype-Olt anxiety' is numerically more positive,
but not signU'icantJ.y closer related to dogmatism than "type-M" or

'ttype-P. ft It does give evidence of the expected tendency.

Tables

6, 7, and 8 all show like evidences and directional tendencies
regarding "type-on anxiety'.

It would seem plausible that anxiety

related to object.ive and social reality (type-O) could interact more
closely with closed mindedness in an individual and thus influences
him more in his risk-taking behavior.

Such a person ,,1OUld appear to

be more closed to reality perhaps as a defense against the threat
1mrolve<i, and this would hinder his acting to his best advantage.

It

could be conjectured then, that an :1.nd:1:v:l.dual high in "type-o lt anxiety
'Who is also characterized by closed mindedness is not sufficiently tree

to say "yes" to the present reality so as to achieve optimal results
in everyday life situations or decisions.

He could not so readily
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weigh, 51ft and evaluate to his greatest advantage.

Further research

is needed however, to at.t"ir.m the effects o£ such a relationship.
h'v'enthough the above is also true of "Total" anxiety, for purposes of

this st;u.ttr it was chosen to concentrate more on tttype-O. n
Table 3 rather clearly points to the fact that neither anxiety'
alone or closed. mindedness alone atfect. the types of risks an
individual is w.Uling to take.

Diese results t..rould be in ha.t'lllOl\V

with hypothesis three statiDg that the two variables in combination
at.tect an indiv.1.dual.'s behavior in a r:Lsk-tald.ng situation.

Kogan

and Wallach (1964) also found no direct relationship of anxiety' with
r.l.sk taking, however, anxie'G'r together with defensiveness lIas correlated
w::I.th processes of risk taking.

H1Pothes1s three predicted that risk-t.ald..ng behavior trould be
related to anxiety in the presence of closed mindedness only.
high negative correlations on Table

direction anticipated.

~e

6 se. to support this and in the

<he speculation for this rather high negative

correlation is that when closed. mindedness is used. as a defense against
anxiety it Jllakes the individual less able to receive and. evaluate
relevant inf'ormation ccmting in .t.rom the outside.

Since be cannot

read:Uy integrate t.b1s new material into his ego system he is not able

to make the most reasonable judgments that would giva h1m the greatest
probability of success.

He acts more .tram a ".fear of failure" motive

in which risk-taking behavior in everyday' situations would be more
bighl.y ext..reme and impulsive.

For this reason he is not as able to

l1ithhold and control actions in order to ach1eve success.
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1his seams to coincide with Atkinson' s theo17 regarding achievement
motivation-that the individual. least threatened and most intently
striving tor success w:Ul tend to take risks of moderate orobab:Ui ties.
""

~is

presupposes his ability "to receive, evaluate and act on relevant

information" (Rokeach, 1960).
A negative correlation of

-.44

(Table 6) between ntype-Oft anxlety

and risk t.ald.l1g 1n the hie,h dogmatic group and the correlation in the

oppos1te d1re"tion tor the low dogmatic group support Atkinson as well
as hypothesis three.

.

'When dogmatism is present with anxiety it leads

the individual in the direction of extireme and impulsive risks.
2be conclusions, then.. that can be drawn troa this stu.ciy' are as

tollows:
1) In agreement 'td.th Rokeach I s t1nd:1ngs.. a.md.ety is s1gnit1caniJ.7

correlated "lith dogma:t.1sa.
2) "1Ype-Otl anxiety is numerically more positiv~ related to

dogmatism than tttype-pn or ntype-H. ,.

2bere is however, no signUicant

ditterence among correlations.

3) "1YPe-0 tl amdety and risk tald.Dg correlate signit1cantly' in
the high dogmatic indi:ri.d.uals, but not in the low dogmatic subjects.
1his sugr,ests that an individual high in anxiety due to external
objects imo is also closed minded tends to act in a more rieky'manner.
i.e., take more extreme and. impulsive risks.
Alt11!rU.eh we can only speculate as to the meaning ot the relationslrl.p between anxiety' and. closed mindedness, this study does indicate

that closed m1ndedness and anxiety' correlate more higb.ly in individuals
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who are extremely risky, i.e., take high risks.

lhis could indicate

that closed m:i.ndedness IIllV be used as one de.fense agtdnst anxiety, and
that tvhen this occurs it does not lead to the most successi'uJ.. decisions
in risk-taking behavior.
J\n alternate explanation 'Which points to the inadequacy of closed

mindedness as a. defense against anxiety can also be speculated.

1I1e

high negative correlation (Table 6) between "type-Off anxiety and risk
taJd.ng in the presence of high dogmatic ind1v1.du.als can be used to

wonder about behmor, i t and

anx::1.ety.

men

dogmat.i.sm is used as a deferwe against

It appears to be a very inadequate means o£ control.

1I1e

resultant behavior of these high-dogmatic individuals tends to be

m.ore impulsive and extreme in risk-taking behavioral situations (-.L4).
On the other hand, when anxiety is de:tended against by another means
other than closed mindedness-as appears to be the case 'tdth the low
dogmatic group-it allows the individual to be .t'reer, pe.rm1tting him

to more readily act acoording to his reason and his goals tor success.
If these assumptions Can be shCMl to be valid-and this vTould be

suggestion tor further research-then closed. mindedness, and probably
aJ.:30

rigidity', are clearl¥ maladaptive means of defense against anx1ety'.

AIIaDg the t.h1Dgs a:rfectiDg a person's perception of the world

is his "aDX1eV." 'When "fear of failure" is the pr1ma.r7 motive ffSr

an individual's behavior, it raises that person's am:1eV level
(AiildDsan, 19S7).

~ would SeeJll

to be especia:1.lT true of the

"t\vpe-O" anxiety (on the N1colq-Walker differential anx1eV scale,

the Personal Reaction Schedule), m1eh 18 due to uncertainV about

extemal demands.

AccordiDg to liokeach (1~) th1s heightened

amd.eV should make an 1nd1v1dual more closed minded and mq be a

def'ense aga:lDst anx1ev. It would appear then, that amd.eV together td.th closed miIldedness (or dogmatisa) would prevent

aD

1ndividual fna. eyaluatiDg aDd act:l.Dg to the best of his interests.
1h1s would suggest a pre.terence for extreme probab1l1t1es aDd extreme

risks 1D ille situations.
1h1s present

s~,

then, is a repl.1cation and an extension of

part of Rokeach's work to discover the relationship existing between

anx1ev and closed miDdedness aDd to find mtat effect these tvlO
variables combined have on 1"1sk-taking behavior in everyd:a::r 81tuations.

92 male subjects were given the PBS, Rokea.eb IS Dogmatism. SCale
aDd the Choice Dlleana Procedure .f'rcml uilich were obtained an an:xiety-,
a "closed m1ndedness II and a Il1"1sk tak1ng It score f!:Jilil__illilii~~,

(s T

i~sul ts

sir~cantly

from this study indicate that anxiety 1s

oorrelated 1dth closed m:l.nd~ess (r .37) from which it is speculated
that the latter can be used as a de.fense against anxiety.

"Type-O"

anxiety, due to uncertainty about external. objects, was found to be
numerically :more closely related to closed mindedness, than I'type-pn

or utype-M, ft yet not signi.f1oantly so. F1nal1y there was the most
positive evidence that anxiety relates to "r1s1dness t'-interpretad

as the tendency to take more extreme and impulsive risks-in high
dogmatio individuals and not so in the low dogmatic.

'!his would

seem to show that a person high. in anxiety, especially

fttype-O,t

n

mo is also characterized by "closed m1ndedness, It tends to take more
extreme risks in order to avoid failure.

'lhese risks do not so

read:l.ly lead to actions with successful outcomes sinoe they are per-

formed trom the motive to avoid failure rather than to achieve Sllccess.
An alternate axplanaticm point:lng to the inadequacy of dogmatism

as a defense against anxiety is also speculated.
'V-J01ud be suggestian for further research.
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